Teacher Pay and Performance
Abstract: Various definitions of teacher performance are offered to add context to the debate about whether teachers should be paid and receive promotions on the basis of performance.
What is teacher performance? Some say it relates to their skill and knowledge, others believe it can be measured by their professional evaluations, student/parent surveys, lesson agenda reviews, teacher self-reflections, observations of how the conduct the classroom. Many point to the infamous standardized test scores, which are backed by Student Learning Objectives (SLO) and Student Growth Percentiles (SGP). SLOs take the number of students in the class, learning content, duration of teaching, assessments, students’ initial knowledge (baseline), and expected student outcome (target).
Teachers unions such as the AFT and NEA are reluctant to accept these definitions and prefer that teachers would be paid on the basis of experience and number of advanced degrees. They believe that there is no clear-cut definition of a good teacher, which limits the accuracy of evaluating their performance. These views are more universally accepted for gym, music, and art teachers. They argue that standardized tests and core academic skills do not reflect critical thinking, problem solving, social, and communication skills. They also bring up the harms of teaching to the test, which limits the breadth of student learning.
They also observe that there are many other variables outside of a teacher’s control that contribute to standardized test scores. Some other variables include different student preferences in learning styles, different demographics, economic and family status, etc. They continue that merit based pay would reduce the number of teachers who would want to teach at-risk, and low income students because the odds are stacked against them. The impact of this point however is lessened by baseline student measures and the fact that a student’s standardized test scores can always be examined in the context of their full academic history.
Thus, a student who always gets 70% on standardized tests, but gets a 75% in a teacher’s class would be more favorable than a student who averaged 80% and remained at 80%. Furthermore, we could adapt the Korean model in which teachers who teach students in adverse conditions get paid extra for their efforts.
Unions understandably fear that merit based pay could create competition amongst teachers for finite federal funds. This could be countered by more incentives for collaboration such as paying the entire science department more for improvements in performance. Critiques can also point that evaluations and surveys from parents, students, principles, and administrators can foster favoritism. However, these kinds of evaluations are just one piece of the pie and are counterbalanced by more objective standardized tests.
What is teacher performance? Some say it relates to their skill and knowledge, others believe it can be measured by their professional evaluations, student/parent surveys, lesson agenda reviews, teacher self-reflections, observations of how the conduct the classroom. Many point to the infamous standardized test scores, which are backed by Student Learning Objectives (SLO) and Student Growth Percentiles (SGP). SLOs take the number of students in the class, learning content, duration of teaching, assessments, students’ initial knowledge (baseline), and expected student outcome (target).
Teachers unions such as the AFT and NEA are reluctant to accept these definitions and prefer that teachers would be paid on the basis of experience and number of advanced degrees. They believe that there is no clear-cut definition of a good teacher, which limits the accuracy of evaluating their performance. These views are more universally accepted for gym, music, and art teachers. They argue that standardized tests and core academic skills do not reflect critical thinking, problem solving, social, and communication skills. They also bring up the harms of teaching to the test, which limits the breadth of student learning.
They also observe that there are many other variables outside of a teacher’s control that contribute to standardized test scores. Some other variables include different student preferences in learning styles, different demographics, economic and family status, etc. They continue that merit based pay would reduce the number of teachers who would want to teach at-risk, and low income students because the odds are stacked against them. The impact of this point however is lessened by baseline student measures and the fact that a student’s standardized test scores can always be examined in the context of their full academic history.
Thus, a student who always gets 70% on standardized tests, but gets a 75% in a teacher’s class would be more favorable than a student who averaged 80% and remained at 80%. Furthermore, we could adapt the Korean model in which teachers who teach students in adverse conditions get paid extra for their efforts.
Unions understandably fear that merit based pay could create competition amongst teachers for finite federal funds. This could be countered by more incentives for collaboration such as paying the entire science department more for improvements in performance. Critiques can also point that evaluations and surveys from parents, students, principles, and administrators can foster favoritism. However, these kinds of evaluations are just one piece of the pie and are counterbalanced by more objective standardized tests.
Works Cited
http://www.centerforpubliceducation.org/teacherevalreview
https://www.engageny.org/resource/new-york-state-student-learning-objective-template
http://www.educationworld.com/a_issues/issues/issues374a.shtml
http://www.ascd.org/publications/educational-leadership/nov09/vol67/num03/The-Problem-with-Performance-Pay.aspx
http://www.ascd.org/publications/educational-leadership/nov09/vol67/num03/The-Problem-with-Performance-Pay.aspx
http://www.centerforpubliceducation.org/teacherevalreview
https://www.engageny.org/resource/new-york-state-student-learning-objective-template
http://www.educationworld.com/a_issues/issues/issues374a.shtml
http://www.ascd.org/publications/educational-leadership/nov09/vol67/num03/The-Problem-with-Performance-Pay.aspx
http://www.ascd.org/publications/educational-leadership/nov09/vol67/num03/The-Problem-with-Performance-Pay.aspx