

LOOKING AHEAD

The Cornell Roosevelt Institute Policy Journal
Center for Foreign Policy and International Studies

Issue No. 3, Fall 2012



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About the Roosevelt Institute

The Roosevelt Institute at Cornell University is a student-run think tank that generates, advocates, and lobbies for progressive policy ideas and initiatives in local, university, state, and national government. Members write for our campus policy journals, complete advocacy and education projects in the local community, host research discussions with professors, write policy and political blogs, and organize campus political debates and policy seminars.

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Letter from the Policy Director

Dear Readers,

I am pleased to present the Center for Foreign Policy's Journal as part of the third issue of *Looking Ahead: The Cornell Roosevelt Institute Policy Journal*. This publication consists of seven policies pieces from the Center for Foreign Policy and International Studies policy analysts. The range and depth of these pieces reflect the careful crafting of policy questions, studious research, and practical solutions the Center's analysts have undertaken to produce timely policy analysis. I hope you take the opportunity to engage with these pieces as a catalyst for thought, and it is my sincere hope that the ideas found in these pages will stimulate greater interest in and attention to the substantial challenges facing American foreign relations.

Sincerely,

Aaron Glickman

Government '13 (A&S)

Policy Director

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America Must Renew the Russian Disarmament Pact

By David Ashley '13, Major: Government (A&S), Email: da429@cornell.edu

The United States must cede to Russia's reasonable demands for revisions to their nuclear disarmament agreement in order to ensure that nuclear disarmament does not fall by the wayside.

Background:

Russia has refused to renew its 20-year old nuclear disarmament agreement with the United States, and the pact expires in June 2013. The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program has been in place since the end of the cold war; it's aim is to secure and disable nuclear and chemical

Key Facts:

- Russia has refused to renew the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, a 20-year old nuclear disarmament agreement with the United States.
- The program is credited with deactivating over 7,600 nuclear warheads from the former Soviet Union.
- Russia has stated that it will only renew the treaty if adjustments to the program are made that provide Russia with more control.

weapons in the former Soviet Union. This pact has been successful in eliminating loose nukes and helping to avert weapons proliferation.¹

Russia's refusal to renew the Nunn-Lugar agreement stems from dissatisfaction with the agreement's current terms. Russia views control and autonomy in its collaboration with the United States towards non-proliferation as a prerequisite for renewing the pact. The Russian government believes that the United States has invasive access to their military resources and knowledge through the Nunn-Lugar program. Moreover, Russian leadership may view this access is unnecessary now that Russia has the means and desire to eliminate loose nukes on its own. In addition, Russia has also expressed concern over the United States nuclear missile presence in Europe through NATO's defense shield, which Russia views as a threat. Despite these concerns, Russia has declared that it remains interested in reaching an agreement and extending the program, provided that revisions are implemented. Similarly, the United States has publicly declared its own willingness to work with Russian officials.²

History:

The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program was created in 1992 and

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sought to ensure the security and safety of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union. The program was a response to concerns that nuclear weapons, components or expertise could fall into the wrong hands after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The legislation of the agreement allowed the United States Defense Department to transfer \$400 million towards the transportation, storage, safeguarding, and destruction of nuclear weapons in the region.³ The agreement had been renewed each time it had expired, with increased funds flowing into the disarmament initiative. The program has even expanded to include projects consisting of defense conversion, military-to-military contacts, environmental restoration, and housing for former Strategic Rocket Forces staff.⁴ The program has been largely successful and is credited with deactivating over 7,600 nuclear warheads and eliminating all nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus.

Analysis:

The United States must conciliate Russia and comply with its demands over revisions to the current program. The possibility of “nuclear leakage,” the movement and abuse of nuclear weapons and materials that were originally under the auspices of the Soviet Union, is still a major global threat and a threat to the United States’ security.⁵ All it takes is one loose nuke to fall into the wrong hands, and all countries will find themselves in a precarious position. Rogue nations such as Iran or North Korea, as well as terrorist organizations, must not be allowed to acquire these loose nukes. This is a far more pressing concern than the degree to which the US is involved in Russian disarmament. Therefore, the United States must ensure that nuclear disarmament continues at an efficient and quick pace.

Moreover, the requests by Russia are reasonable and do not damage United States national interests. First of all, Russia has not been a major threat since the Cold War ended and, as a result, intrusive supervision of the program is unnecessary. Second, the agreement was made at a time when the Russian state was extremely disorganized; consequently, the terms of the agreement are not as relevant today as they were at the outset of the agreement. At that time, direct American involvement was essential because the Russians did not possess the capacity to adequately manage the imminent threat of loose nuclear weapons. Currently, Russia is a nation capable of removing its nuclear weapons without aid. Russia has been spending its own money and resources towards disarmament and has recently expressed its desire to continue alone.⁶ Russia’s willingness and capacity to make progress on non-proliferation should

Talking Points:

- The US must prioritize collaborative disarmament efforts over its current degree of control in its agreement with Russia.
- Russia’s demands are reasonable given its current political condition and the changes that have occurred since the founding of the program.

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allow the United States to reduce its control of the program and allow greater Russian autonomy. Nonetheless, this issue is still too important to international security for the United States to grant Russia complete control, as United States involvement is vital to ensure the program's continued success and efficiency.

Next Steps:

The United States must work diligently and quickly to resolve Russia's dissatisfaction with the Nunn-Lugar agreement and apply new revisions. Providing Russia with more control and autonomy in the program is not only a small concession to make in relation to what is at stake with non-proliferation, but it is also warranted given Russia's current capabilities. Diffusing the tension with Russia over disarmament and increasing cooperation may also lead to improved relations in other policy spheres.

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Empowering Women Entrepreneurs in the Middle East: Sowing the Seeds for Democracy Development post-Arab Spring

By Amy Frieder '15, Major: Industrial and Labor Relations (ILR), Email: abf72@cornell.edu

A policy providing incentives for investing in companies run by Arab women in the Middle East would result in a more pluralistic Arab world and encourage the development of new democracies. Aiding the economic growth of countries in the region would also improve US foreign relations with Arab countries, and both sides would reap the benefits of an improved business relationship.

Background:

As a result of the Arab Spring, the people of Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya democratically elected their leadership for the first time in recent history. While these newly elected regimes experiment with different approaches to governance, America must encourage them to develop their democracies, and thus the degree of political rights and civil liberties in the region. "International support is critical," Secretary of State Hillary Clinton remarked at the UN in September. It is in the US's interest to "help countries in transition find the right path forward."¹

Key Facts:

- Research has shown that economic empowerment is one of the most important interventions that help women's rights.⁹
- This is exemplified in Saudi Arabia, where women's economic advancement has led to a moderate winding back of restrictions on women.¹⁰

A large discrepancy between the number of educated Arab women and the number Arab women in the workforce currently hampers the economy and political plurality of the countries in the region. Even in Qatar, where women constitute 63% of university students, women make up only 12% of the workforce and 7% of legislators, senior officials, and managers, according to the UN Statistics Division.² More often than not, they participate in the informal economy through handicrafts, bread baking, "petty commodity trading, selling articles at weekly markets and acting as the middle-woman in transporting goods between rural and urban areas."³

History:

Most of the US government's Overseas Private Investment Corporation's current projects are located in the West Bank and Jordan, which are not among the Arab countries experiencing a post-revolution transition. OPIC should expand its projects to include

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Arab countries with new democracies to encourage their development, which would “help solve critical world challenges and in doing so, advance U.S. foreign policy.”⁴ The National Endowment for Democracy, however, has given grants to organizations in Arab transitional democracies, and several have been beneficial to women. Examples include an association for women’s political participation in Tunisia, a center for feminist studies in Egypt, and a women’s rights advocacy campaign in Iraq.⁷ Empowering women in the workforce is another way to help advance equal gender rights political involvement among women, while supporting economic development in their countries.

Analysis:

President Obama’s Fiscal Year 2013 budget includes a section of funding for international programs, part of which “responds to the Arab Spring by supporting the aspirations of people in the Middle East and North Africa, with more than \$800 million to assist countries in transition and create incentives for long-term economic, political, and trade reforms.” This spending, the OMB report states, fosters “stability around the world to protect our national security,” and supports economic growth both abroad and domestically, opening new markets for US businesses and increasing trade.⁶ If the US were to allocate some of this funding to encourage investment in businesses run by Arab women, it would help offset the damage that oil booms tend to do to women’s advancement in the region. Indeed, studies have shown that “when a nation’s oil profits soar, the number of women in the workforce invariably declines the next year.” This has profound consequences on women’s political engagement, as “leaving home and entering the workplace produces greater political awareness and participation among women” as well as a strong force to fight patriarchal norms and restrictions to women’s rights that limit developing democracies.⁷

Talking Points:

- The free trade agreement with Morocco is expected to “increase over US economic activity by \$178 million annually.”¹¹
- Muhammad Yunus and Grameen Bank won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006 for their work in micro-credit, giving loans to poor people in Bangladesh that allowed them to work to bring about their own development. “Micro-credit has proven to be an important liberating force in societies where women in particular have to struggle against repressive social and economic conditions,” according to the Nobel Peace Prize press release.¹²

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Next Steps:

A policy that would provide an incentive for investment in companies run by Arab women supplemented by increased funding from the National Endowment for Democracy and expanded OPIC projects in post-Arab Spring countries would encourage new democracies in the Middle East to develop with improved political rights and civil liberties. The policy would also open new markets for US businesses, forging more business relationships similar to the free trade agreement the US currently holds with Jordan, Bahrain, Morocco, and Oman.⁸ Empowering women economically and encouraging democracy development would benefit US foreign policy and economy.

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Redefining What It Means to be a “Refugee”

By Ariel Smilowitz '15, Major: Government (A&S), Email: ags233@cornell.edu

In order to maximize the alleviation of contemporary refugee crises around the world, the UNHCR Statute and 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees should re-define the term “refugee” to include contemporary trends of forced displacement.

Background:

Following World War Two, in 1950 the UN General Assembly created the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in order to protect refugees and alleviate their plight.¹ The creation of the UNHCR coincided with the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, as well as a statute that focused on two principle areas:

working with states to ensure refugees’ access to protection and ensuring that refugees have access to durable solutions, which include either reintegration within their original country or integration within a new country.²

Key Facts:

- The UNHCR was established following events of WW II and its Statute reflects the political environment of the time period.
- Along with the 1951 Convention, a specific definition for the term “refugee” is laid out, including people who are persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality or political opinion.

In addition to this core mandate, the statute went on to define a “refugee” as someone who, “as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear or for reasons other than personal convenience, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear or for reasons other than personal convenience, is unwilling to return to it.”³

History:

With the establishment of the UNHCR and the 1951 Convention, a wider global refugee regime emerged with the UNHCR Statute and 1951 Convention as its centerpiece, one that has shaped refugee affairs not only during the remainder of the twentieth century but also during the beginning of the twenty-first century as well.

As the decades have progressed, the UNHCR has had to constantly work around its

limited mandate in order to navigate the changing political environment. For the past sixty years the global refugee regime has revolved around agreements and definitions that are archaic and obsolete, especially after the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in 1991. As a result, the UNHCR is in a constant state of adaptation and expansion of both its core mandate and the scope of its work in order to achieve its goals within the context of a changing political landscape and changing dynamics of forced displacement.⁴

Analysis:

Since the end of the Cold War, the nature of forced displacement has changed, intertwining with wider trends in world politics that include climate change, international migration, urbanization, food insecurity, state fragility, and terrorism.⁵ Thus, rather than force the UNHCR to work within the limited scope of archaic Cold War rhetoric, the UNHCR Statute and 1951 Convention should be updated to redefine what it means to be a “refugee” in the post-Cold War and

post-9/11 world, so that the current global refugee regime is reshaped and put within a contemporary context of political and international affairs in order to fully maximize the alleviation of contemporary refugee crises around the world.

Talking Points:

- The UNHCR continually has to work within the limited scope of its sixty-year old Statute in order to effectively alleviate contemporary refugee crises.
- At the beginning of 2011, the UNHCR estimated that there were 43.7 million forcibly displaced people worldwide and among this number only 10.55 million refugees were under the Office’s care.⁶

Next Steps:

The UNHCR should update its Statute and 1951 Convention. Its new definition of the term “refugee” should include people who not only have a fear of persecution due to race, religion, nationality or political opinion but also people who have been displaced due to climate change, international migration, urbanization, food insecurity, state fragility, and terrorism.

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2) Ibid, 2.

3) UNHCR, “Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,” <http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c39e1.html> (Accessed 23 Oct. 2012), 7.

4) Bretts, Loescher, and Milner, *UNHCR*, 3.

5) Ibid, 133

6) Ibid, 1

Narco-Terrorism in Afghanistan

By Drew Hancock '14, Major: Government (A&S), Email: dth47@cornell.edu

The United States federal government should change its policy toward opium farmers in Afghanistan to stabilize the region.

Background:

Afghan opium predates the US invasion of 2001. During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979-89), Afghan warlords used the opium market to fund the insurgency. After the Soviet withdrawal, the Taliban monopolized the drug trade. In the 1990s, the Taliban controlled almost all of the region's opium production and Afghanistan accounted for around 75% of the world's opium production by 2000.¹

Key Facts:

- Afghanistan produces 90% of the world's opium.
- In 2011 opium production rose 61%.
- In 2011 the United States increased eradication efforts by 65%.

The 2001 invasion of Afghanistan created another power vacuum and opium production resumed after a lag in 2000. As of a year ago, Afghanistan accounted for 90% of the world's opium production after an increase of 61% since 2010. According to BBC, the US and NATO increased opium poppy eradication efforts by 65% in 2011, only to see production increase dramatically.² It is obvious that opium eradication efforts are not working and that alternatives must be put in place if the region is to be stabilized.

History:

Eradication efforts by the United States began in 2004, after the Taliban was formally ousted. The strict eradication continued until 2009 when the US handed over eradication to local governors. The 2009 change occurred when the US government noticed that eradication was not reducing Taliban profits while increasing anti-US sentiment. The United States and the UN continue to support eradication by local governors and have witnessed increases in poppy farming since 2009. The US counterinsurgency has also been flooding provinces with money for rural development. The programs have little to show for. "Most of the money was spent on unsustainable, short-term, cash-for-work programs that amount more to political handouts and buying love."³

Analysis:

The US-NATO eradication efforts treat opium farming as a source of the insurgency. While opium production is highly correlated with unrest in Afghanistan, it is not the

underlying cause.⁴ The United States must incentivize farmers to produce other goods through long-term aid and infrastructure investment. This must be done before eradication of opium production because farmers will resort to opium whenever there is no alternative.

The Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit commissioned the Mansfield and Pain study of opium in order to analyze opium reduction methods in four Afghan provinces. The study, "Evidence from the Field: Understanding Changing Levels of Opium Production in Afghanistan," showed that economic incentives such as increased market opportunities reduced opium cultivation in the province of Badakhshan.⁵ Coercion only seemed to cause fluctuation in production.

Part of the current eradication policy allocates funding for development, but only after opium production ceases. This policy destabilizes the region. Eradication strips farmers of their only source of income, incentivizing them to support the Taliban. Without offering a sustainable alternative, eradication only serves to further destabilize Afghanistan.

Some historical precedent can be found in Turkey and Thailand, which have curtailed opium production. This success resulted from concerted government efforts to support alternative livelihoods.⁶ If the US wishes to see this sort of success in Afghanistan the policy of strict eradication should be reversed and rural development should be implemented in a smarter way.

Next Steps:

The United States and its allies should focus on policies that have proven effective in the past. Education for women, micro-loans to farmers, and increasing the price of alternative crops would incentivize the market away from opium. One potential policy may be making small loans to farmers on the precondition that they use it to farm other crops. The United States should also buy alternative crops to increase demand, thereby increasing prices and profitability.

In order to create a viable government the US must provide people with strategic increases in investment. Policies that focus only on eradication, with development investment maybe arriving later, will continue to frustrate the war. US policies must manipulate the market away from opium, rather than fruitlessly try to squash all produc-

Talking Points:

- Eradication efforts strip farmers of their only source of income.
- Eradication efforts strip farmers of their only source of income.
- Developmental programs, micro-loans, and buying other crops have been successful in the past to curb opium production.
- Opium production is not the cause of unrest in Afghanistan, although they are related.

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Pacifying Hamas, a Pragmatic Approach

By Noah Berman '13, Major: Near Eastern Studies (A&S), Email: ntb34@cornell.edu

The United States can reduce a major security threat to Israel while improving Palestinian living standards by engaging and strengthening Hamas's moderate elements.

Background:

Israel initially allowed Hamas to function due to its community works and opposition to Fatah, but has since attempted to marginalize the movement through imprisonment, exile, and military campaigns. After Hamas's 2007 coup Israel imposed a blockade on Hamas,¹ however smugglers have effectively broken this through the use of underground tunnels into Egypt.² Since 2009, Israel and Hamas have had a relative détente and some unofficial communication, including official and unofficial truces.³ However, since September 2012, Hamas has begun directly participating in rocket attacks for the first time since 2009, perhaps to increase its waning popularity.⁴

Key Facts:

- Hamas is a pragmatic political movement that uses violence as only one tool of many.
- Hamas is a substantial force that must be engaged in any viable peace plan.
- The United States can incentivize pacification through economic and diplomatic means.

The United States has placed Hamas on its list of terrorist organizations and has never held official dialogue with the group or recognized the validity of their rule, differing instead to Mahmoud Abbas President of the Palestinian Authority and Fatah. Many Western analysts and academics agree that despite Western efforts, Hamas has increased its strength and that a new approach is necessary.

History:

Hamas, has been the main Islamist force in the Palestinian Territories since its founding in 1987.⁵ Contrary to popular perception, Hamas practices realist policies based on cost-benefit analyses.⁶ Hamas has grown in popularity from 15-20% during the mid-1990s to roughly 50% in recent years⁷ and narrowly won elections in the Palestinian Territories in January 2006 and in June 2007 seized absolute power in Gaza from Fatah in a violent coup.

Hamas' power is split among various branches and factions, most importantly the "inside" military branch and political branch, both based in Gaza, and the "outside" political branch,⁸ recently moved from Syria to Qatar and Egypt. In recent internal elec-

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tions the “inside” factions, with hardline stances on Fatah and Israel, gained significant power.⁹ This group is most concerned with maintaining control in Gaza by catering to increasingly disillusioned public angry with rampant corruption and poor living conditions.¹⁰

Analysis:

The United States should incentivize moderation and pacification within Hamas, namely (1) reconciliation with Fatah, (2) renunciation of violence, (3) participation in democratic elections cutting ties with Iran, (4) recognition of Israel, (5) cutting ties with Iran, and (6) the signing of a 25 year *Hudna*, or religiously sanctioned truce.

So far, military methods and political isolation have not yielded desired results. However, Hamas has

softened its approach since the assassination of its former leaders, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and Abd el-Aziz Rantissi in 2004, and its foray into politics.¹¹ If the United States can convince Hamas’s moderates that they can achieve a state within 1967 boundaries through the above steps the movement is likely to participate. The above steps would need to be coupled with (closely monitored) economic aid, political normalization in a piecemeal fashion to slowly and cautiously encourage Hamas to join the mainstream of politics. This could be made acceptable to the Israeli government if the steps are properly monitored, Israel’s safety is assured, and it leads to a lasting peace process.

Talking Points:

- By indirectly offering economic and diplomatic concessions, the US can offer Hamas a path to legitimize its leadership through steps towards moderation.
- Hamas has shown willingness towards détente with Israel and internal reform.
- Dialogue with Hamas can isolate Iran by depriving the Islamic Republic of one its only regional allies.
- Prior attempts to eliminate or marginalize Hamas have failed and a new approach is necessary.

Next Steps:

The aforementioned steps must be achieved in a logical order, beginning with a reconciliation with Fatah. The US can encourage this by working with moderate leaders of Hamas through third-parties such as Egypt, Qatar, or Germany (who have been used in the past). The US can push its Arab allies to offer aid to the Palestinians conditional on a reconciliation and non-violent democratic process. Khaled Meshaal, the leader of the “outside” faction from 1996 until 2012, could. Meshaal, who has previously called for reconciliation, grew up in Kuwait¹² and has connections to Gulf countries including Qatar, which donated \$400 million to Gaza in October.¹³ Additionally, Meshaal reportedly offered Israel a *Hudna* (see above) in 2006.¹⁴

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In this process the United States must “lead from behind” because Hamas cannot negotiate if it is viewed as conceding to the West. However by exerting pressure through intermediaries the US may be able to foment real results.

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A New Approach to Iranian Sanctions

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Shifting from sanctions with broad deleterious economic effects to targeted sanctions may more effectively induce compromise from the Iranian regime.

Background:

The United States, European Union and United Nations are enforcing economic sanctions on Iran's oil exports, reducing oil exports by a third, increasing inflation, and driving up unemployment¹. These sanctions are intended to weaken Iran's economy and pressure its government to make concessions on its nuclear program. Many experts believe the covert goal of the US is to nudge the Iranian people towards an Arab Spring-style overthrow of the government, bringing in democratic, moderate leadership².

Key Facts:

- Smart sanctions are an alternative to broad oil embargoes that place travel, trade and financial sanctions on government officials and the economic elite.
- Because of oil sanctions, the prices of necessities such as milk, bread, and rice have more than doubled this year,¹¹ while the salaries of government officials rose by 15%.¹²

Sanctions have not pushed Iran to make substantive compromises. This June, the P5+1 (Britain, China, France, Russia, the US and Germany) and Iran resumed nuclear talks; western powers wanted Iran to curtail its uranium enrichment to 20% purity, while Iran was adamant that uranium enrichment was non-negotiable and that its nuclear program had peaceful motives³. Accordingly, the US is debating increasing sanctions so as to avoid military action to destroy, or stall, Iran's uranium enrichment.

History:

Iran's nuclear program began in the 1960s under the Shah dictatorship. It was abandoned after the government was overthrown in the 1979 Islamic Revolution. In the mid-1990s, Iran's moderate president Mohammad Khatami restarted the program. While Iran insisted that it was abiding by the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which allowed uranium enrichment with peaceful intentions, observers were suspicious of an underground weapons program. After threats of economic sanctions, Khatami suspended enrichment and allowed inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) while continuing negotiations with Britain, France and Germany⁴.

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In 2005, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a hard-line conservative, became president and resumed uranium enrichment, ending nuclear negotiations. The IAEA called for the program to be halted until inspectors were given access into Iran's underground nuclear facilities.⁵

Analysis:

US, EU and UN sanctions have crippled the Iranian economy. Iran's revenue has dropped by 60%, inflation is between 20 and 25%, and, in recent weeks, its currency has lost 40% of its value against the dollar.⁶ The burden of reduced revenues has fallen disproportionately on ordinary Iranians. Payments to clerics, military officials and the economic elite are secure, while public programs have been slashed.⁷ Thus, sanctions have minimal impact on the government's strength.

Talking Points:

- Iran's history makes a popular uprising brought on from foreign influences unlikely.
- Smart sanctions place concentrated economic pressure on the Iranian government and minimize the externalities affecting civilians.

An alternative to moderating Ahmadinejad is to instigate regime change. Arguably, exacerbating Iran's economic woes would provoke a popular movement to change the government. Yet, Iran has survived some of the most devastating revolutions in history, many sparked by foreign influence, and is capable of confronting domestic dissent.⁸ Consequently, Iranian protests in response to rising food prices have been slow to gain momentum.⁹ The Green Movement, failed protests demanding the Ahmadinejad's removal, exemplifies the government's ability to stem political dissent decisively. A hesitant population, paired with a suffocating political environment, makes an uprising a long shot.

While broad sanctions affect everyone, targeted sanctions can concentrate consequences on the government and the upper class. These "smart sanctions" place travel restrictions on the wealthiest Iranians, trade restrictions on luxury goods and on other goods on which elites depend, and financial sanctions such as freezing government officials' assets.¹⁰ The regime may not respond to the suffering of its people, but if its own pocketbooks shrink it is likely to concede and seek relief.

Next Steps:

"Smart sanctions" on government officials are the most effective method to incentivize the Iranian government to be more open in nuclear negotiations. These sanctions alone are not enough to force Iran to comply with all of the US and UN demands unless both parties demonstrate greater flexibility in negotiations as well. The P5 should

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consider proposals to ease sanctions as Iran exports some of its stockpiled enriched uranium.

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Information Warfare: Responding to Changing Times

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The United States federal government should substantially increase funding for the implementation and application of Space Radar.

Background:

Nuclear weaponry is becoming less important in deterrence. Taboos and practical deterrence ensure these weapons will likely never be used by states. However, rogue nations' acquisition of WMD technology complicates nuclear use for fear of reprisal.¹ Conventional non-nuclear deterrence against such threats is essential but require real-time, persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.

Key Facts:

- Nuclear deterrence fails to prevent conflict as evidenced by the Korean and Vietnam wars, the Yom Kippur War, and Argentina attacking the Falkland Islands in 1982.
- A single site for targeting could be monitored using only 10% of one satellite's resources and persistent, real-time coverage capability for missile defense and other monitoring would use even less.
- Many US adversaries have ICBMs located at immobile sites, making it possible for the US to use CPGS to execute a preemptive or preventative strike.

Nuclear deterrence has lost focus foreign policy. Most analysts attribute this to the unlikelihood of nuclear war due to taboos and deterrence between states. The horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki generated immediate taboos against nuclear weapons. Current military threats require less emphasis on destructive power and a focus on technology. Space is becoming militarized, and it is the perfect axis to accrue timely intelligence that contributes to the conventional military superiority.

History:

Space Radar was created by the government to create new spy satellites in order to increase the ISR capabilities of the United States. The Air Force ran the program and deemed it to improve conventional capabilities. The technology was meant to create Surface Moving Target Indication, Synthetic Aperture Radar imaging and High Resolution Terrain Information capabilities. In 2008, due to high projected costs, Space Radar was cut.²

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Analysis:

The lifetime cost for a nine satellites with Space Radar capabilities was estimated to be thirty-four billion dollars. Space radar resolves the necessary real-time precision intelligence that is needed to guide missiles for Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS).

CPGS provides the ability for policymakers to strike, with conventional weapons, anywhere on the planet within an hour—something that can only be done with nuclear weaponry now. CPGS is inevitable because of DOD commitment.³ However, the DOD has not determined if the technology existed for CPGS to function precisely. Lack of intelligence makes CPGS imprecise. Space Radar would provide near-continuous tracking capabilities, dramatically improving CPGS.

Talking Points:

- There is little risk that CPGS would be confused for nuclear weapons.
- Nuclear deterrence is a poor defense strategy.
- The government should support this proposal to deter rogue and terrorist attacks while limiting the escalation of conflict between nuclear and non-nuclear adversaries.

CPGS would lock in conventional superiority. CPGS will limit collateral damage, while signaling US intent to become involved in a conflict. Some analysts worry that conventional missile strikes could be perceived as ICBMs because of their speed. However distinct launch locations,⁴ diplomacy, testing and differing flight trajectories make this unlikely.⁵ CPGS also breaks through the air defenses, further marginalizing the utility of nuclear weapons. CPGS could also strike countries' nuclear arsenals. In prior conflicts, nuclear weapons did not cede any advantage to the US. They proved useless during the Vietnam and Korean wars and are not seen as a realistic threat. Thus, CPGS will counter the growing futility of nuclear weapons with conventional alternatives.

CPGS enables the US to control conflict escalation because it signals the willingness of the US involvement in that conflict,⁶ altering combatants' decision making. An example of a conflict that could utilize CPGS is a Chinese invasion of Taiwan; China's recent re-orientation of its military focus toward naval capabilities limits the effectiveness of US forces. CPGS enables the US to blast through area-denial systems and allows for naval involvement.⁷ CPGS also enables the US to handle time-critical targets like terrorists because it gives decision-makers the ability to rapidly respond to crises.⁸ Unlike nuclear threats, terrorist organizations perceive conventional strikes as realistic, which would deter them from many attacks they would otherwise pursue.⁹ A response to a terrorist threat would currently take too long; CPGS gives us the ability respond to threats that we otherwise could not.

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Next Steps:


The technology for Space Radar already exists. A prototype was already tested by the National Reconnaissance Office and worked. Consideration must be given to how the project should be presented to the public without startling the world. The DOD could research more cost-efficient methods of production; however, this could be done after the program's reinstatement. The DOD should implement a prize-oriented (tax break or research grant) approach to entice development companies, like Lockheed-Martin, to develop a more cost-effective version of Space radar while maintaining the full range of capabilities. Technological advances since 2008 make this feasible and worth investigating.

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