


LOOKING AHEAD

The Cornell Roosevelt Institute Policy Journal

Center for Foreign Policy and International Studies

Issue No. 4, Spring 2013



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About the Roosevelt Institute

The Roosevelt Institute at Cornell University is a student-run think tank that generates and promotes progressive policy initiatives and that seeks to inform and inspire public policy debate in the Cornell and greater-Ithaca communities. Members write for our *Looking Ahead* journals, craft blog posts on important current events, organize political debates, host speaker series, and coordinate advocacy and education projects. The Cornell Roosevelt Institute is one of over eighty chapters in the larger Roosevelt Institute Campus Network.

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Letter from the Policy Director

Dear Readers,

I am pleased to present the second issue of *Looking Ahead: The Cornell Roosevelt Institute Policy Journal* from the Center for Foreign Policy and International Studies. This publication consists of eight policies pieces from the Center for Foreign Policy and International Studies policy analysts. The range and depth of these pieces reflect the careful crafting of questions, diligent research, and thoughtful analysis the Center's analysts have undertaken. I hope that you will take the time to earnestly engage with this journal, as you may find it to be an exceptional catalyst for further research and discussion. It has been a pleasure and honor to work with such a talented group of students, and I look forward to the future as the Roosevelt Institute's Center for Foreign Policy and International Studies will undoubtedly continue to grow and thrive.

Sincerely,

Aaron Glickman

Government '13 (A&S)

Policy Director

Center for Foreign Policy and International Studies

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Putting Out the Fuel to the Fire: Deterring Corporations From Subcontracting Manufacturing to Sweatshops Abroad

By Amy Frieder '15, Major: Industrial and Labor Relations, Email: abf72@cornell.edu

A policy that would effectively deter U.S. companies from subcontracting the manufacturing of their products to factories with sweatshop conditions, perhaps by giving the U.S. Department of Labor's Division of Trade Agreement Administration and Technical Cooperation (TAATC) the ability to sue corporations for their negligence in failing to be accountable for labor violations, would squeeze sweatshop funds at their source.

Background:

Wal-Mart, J.C. Penney, Disney, Target, Sears, Nike, Adidas, Apple, HP, and Dell: these companies, and many more major corporations, all profit from exploiting workers in developing countries.¹ The phenomena of subcontracting has resulted in long supply

chains that divide retailers in the global North from their supplier factories in the global South, allowing corporations to shirk their responsibility of maintaining decent working conditions and deflect criticism of operating sweatshops. An unfortunate result of the global marketplace, subcontracting has enabled these corporations to exploit workers more easily, highlighting a void in public policy that would require corporations to be accountable for their subcontracted production plants overseas. For example, after a factory in Indonesia which manufactured Adidas among other brands' products abruptly closed in 2011, depriving 2,800 workers of \$3.4 million in severance pay, Adidas stated that the company "cannot assume nor accept liability for the impact of closures or lay-offs at factories which they do not own themselves" and refused to be "held responsible for someone else breaking the law."² Corporations such as Adidas continue to avoid accountability for sweatshops and labor violations by claiming that they are not responsible for working conditions dictated by subcontractors; yet, by doing business with these sweatshops and maintaining fiduciary relationships with them, these corporations enable labor violations to occur with few ramifications.

Key Facts:

- The U.S. Department of Labor defines sweatshop as "an employer that violates more than one federal or state labor law governing minimum wage and overtime, child labor, industrial homework, occupational safety and health, workers compensation or industry"

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History:

Sources of global labor regulation have included international treaties, unilateral sanctions, social clauses in trade agreements, and transnational advocacy networks.³ These transnational advocacy networks have pressured brands to adopt codes of conduct, stating rules for labor standards by which factories must—theoretically—comply, and these codes have proliferated since the 1990s.⁴ Several organizations, including the Fair Labor Association (FLA), the Workers Rights Consortium (WRC), and Worldwide Responsible Apparel Production (WRAP), work as third-party monitors in ensuring that factories comply with their codes of conduct.⁵ Although they share the same goal, these watchdog organizations work very differently: the FLA works collaboratively with industry in order to certify brands based on external monitoring of a larger sample of factories; the WRC “conducts in-depth, continuous investigations on a limited number of factories selected through a bottom-up process whereby workers and local NGOs lodge complaints on violations of codes of conduct”; and the WRAP certification monitors compliance of codes of conduct and certifies factories that show compliance.⁶ However, each of these organizations has its limitations: the WRC is limited in its coverage, the FLA is limited in its stringency, and since they have different approaches to labor rights monitoring, they are often at odds, as their campaigns against each other waste time and energy that could be used to monitor working conditions.⁷ WRAP has also shown its limitations, as it was recently revealed that a factory in Bangladesh which received a WRAP certification employed approximately 200 children, some 11 years old or younger, in sewing garments for Hanes, J.C. Penney, and Puma.⁸ Despite third-party monitors’ efforts, the millions of sweatshop workers in the developing world cannot rely on these organizations to enforce codes of conduct and reveal labor violations because they are simply too limited and ineffective, as “most of the apparel industry falls outside the reach of any serious monitoring system.”⁹ Additionally, these efforts monitor current working conditions, but they fail to deter U.S. companies from subcontracting their manufacturing to factories with sweatshop conditions in the future.

Analysis:

The U.S. government has proceeded beyond reactionary labor monitoring, however. Proactive efforts to promote decent labor conditions worldwide have been made through free

Talking Points:

- An investigation after a recent factory fire “found evidence of high-rise death traps, where poorly maintained electrical systems, locked exits, limited firefighting equipment, and mountains of combustible fabric” providing “a recipe for disaster.”¹³

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trade agreements or trade promotions that include labor provisions in order to “ensure that the benefits of trade are widely shared, that worker rights are not denied in order to gain a trade advantage or attract investment, and consequently that U.S. businesses and workers compete on a level playing field globally.”¹⁰ While

these labor provisions may have improved working conditions in countries included in the trade agreements (Jordan, Chile, Singapore, Morocco, Australia, Bahrain, Oman, Peru, Colombia, Panama, and South Korea, as well as countries in the NAFTA and Central American FTA-Dominican Republic agreements), it would be unrealistic to expect the U.S. government to immediately and effectively institute trade agreements with every country with subpar labor conditions for the purpose of expanding protective labor provisions to a greater number of workers. Even if this were possible, these labor agreements would still likely lack the deterrence necessary to force corporate responsibility for labor conditions in subcontracted production plants.

Additionally, the U.S. Department of Labor’s Division of Trade Agreement Administration and Technical Cooperation (TAATC) in its Bureau of International Labor Affairs works with governments and international organizations to “assess labor problems, make suggestions, and provide assistance to help strengthen labor standards as well as review complaints “alleging that a trading partner has violated the conditions required by the labor chapter of a free trade agreement.”¹¹ The TAATC maintains “over 25 active technical cooperation projects across the globe,” yet almost all of these projects are limited to the issue of child labor,¹² neglecting other concerns such as workers being overworked, underpaid, and employed in unsafe conditions. Perhaps these projects have resulted in fewer child workers, but the issues of corporate irresponsibility and proliferating sweatshops remain. Without policy innovation, the fuel to the fire which funds these sweatshops and spreads these conditions will continue to leak through: if multi-billion dollar corporations are allowed to subcontract their manufacturing to sweatshops, sweatshops will continue to exist.

Next Steps:

A policy that would effectively deter U.S. companies from subcontracting their manufacturing to factories with sweatshop conditions, perhaps by giving the U.S. Department of Labor’s Division of Trade Agreement Administration and Technical Cooperation (TAATC) the ability to sue corporations for their negligence in failing to be accountable for labor violations, would attack the sweatshop funds at their source. A government policy aimed to reestablish the link between brands in the global North

and factories in the global South would ensure corporations' accountability for working conditions while holding true to the American ideal as "the land of liberty" rather than "the land for funding exploitation."

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Towards More Effective Nuclear Deterrence: From the Nuclear Triad to a Dyad

By David Rubin '16, Major: Industrial and Labor Relations, Email: dbr83@cornell.edu

The United States should reform its nuclear deterrence strategy, known as the triad. The intercontinental ballistic missile and submarine launched ballistic missile components should be maintained, while the nuclear bomber leg of the triad should be cut and converted to a purely conventional bomber. The funding allocated to the bomber leg of the nuclear triad should be reallocated to the acquisition of follow-on infrastructure for intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Background:

The nuclear triad was developed by the United States to protect Americans from nuclear war. The triad incorporated contemporary deterrence theories, which resulted in the birth of its three components: land, sea and air.

The land portion of the nuclear triad includes Intercontinental

Ballistic Nuclear (ICBMs) missiles that are housed in underground silos. This portion provides the Department of Defense with a large number of warheads with virtually unlimited striking ability. The drawback of ICBM sites is their heightened vulnerability to enemy strikes, because of their immobile locations.

The sea portion of the nuclear triad includes submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The intention of these weapons was to provide the United States second-strike capability in case of an attack. These weapons are difficult to track, and even more difficult to destroy, which provides the US with insurance in the case of an attack. The problem with these weapons is their range and accuracy, which developed a need for the triad to mask its inadequacies with a different weapon.

The air portion of the triad consists of B-2 and B-52 bombers equipped with Air Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs), capable of launching nuclear weapons. Limited targeting capabilities of ICBMs prompted their development because they provided the ability for the US to maintain precision strike capabilities.

Key Facts:

- The nuclear triad was created when there was insufficient technology to maintain stability with a dyad
- ICBMs are operating at least 30 years beyond their design life
- SLBMs are mobile and hard to track, making them nearly impossible to strike

Analysis:

The United States is in persistent danger of losing its nuclear edge. Rapidly approaching budget cuts make it nearly impossible to increase funding for modernization of the US' nuclear force. The current version of ICBMs, the Minuteman III, are working decades beyond their design life and are at risk of failure, with no upgrades or replacements planned for the

near future.¹ This presents a problem due to ICBMs' centrality to nuclear deterrence because of its first-strike capabilities. This entails the ability to wipe out an enemy's nuclear weapons arsenal. ICBMs provide this capability because they are able to strike anywhere in the world within an hour of launch and have very precise targeting capabilities due to improved intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. The current program is outdated and requires massive funding for upgrades that the government does not have.²

One solution to such an overarching problem involves cutting one leg of the triad and creating, instead, a dyad. That leg is the B-52 bomber.³ This leg was initially created to complement the accuracy and precision flaws of the other legs of the triad. When the triad was created, intelligence limitations and poor strike precision affected ICBMs. However, advancements in tracking technology eliminated these limitations, diminishing the need to rely on bombers as a failsafe should ICBM launch infrastructure be modernized.

In order to have credible nuclear deterrence, a country must have second strike capability. Due to their range, ICBMs can provide a devastating first strike and would be perceived as having such capability if modernized; SLBMs have the capability for second strike because they are difficult to track and destroy, making them likely to survive a first strike.

B-52 bombers have lost their significance in nuclear deterrence simply because enabling technology for the other legs of the triad eliminated the need for this third leg. Bombers would be better as conventional aircraft because to bolster US conventional deterrence.⁴ Conventional capabilities enable the US to control conflict escalation because conventional involvement signals the willingness of the US to fight and threatens

Talking Points:

- Making a nuclear dyad would not adversely affect US deterrence posture
- B-52 bombers are outdated and can have their nuclear role cut
- ICBMs and SLBMs create first and second strike capability

US involvement in the escalation of a conflict, even if it passes the threshold for nuclear use. Should the United States lose its conventional superiority, aggressors will have an incentive to settle scores because they wouldn't fear US involvement due to the unlikelihood of immediate escalation to nuclear use. This upgrade of the US conventional arsenal would be accompanied by a transfer of saved funds to the modernization of ICBM infrastructure, which would solidify US deterrence posture.

Next Steps:

The technology for modernizing ICBMs exists, however any pursuit of upgrades is unlikely because of funding constraints. There are plans to modernize the B-52 nuclear bombers; should that leg of the triad be cut, all current and future funds allocated to this purpose would be advanced toward the modernization of ICBM infrastructure. Countries like Russia are already modernizing their nuclear forces, and for the US to maintain archaic technology as the cornerstone of its deterrence strategy would be akin to forfeiting global credibility. The DOD should curtail the B-52s nuclear role and instate it as part of US conventional forces.

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Free Trade and the European Union: Economic Development for the Future

By Luka Jankovic '17, Major: Applied Economics and Management, Email: lmj57@cornell.edu

The United States should pursue a free trade agreement with the European Union.

Background:

On February 12, 2013, President Barack Obama announced a new round of trade negotiations with the European Union. The proposed free trade agreement was again raised during the Brussels Forum between March 15 and 17.¹ The United States and European Union have the world's largest trade relationship, worth \$636.8 billion in 2011.² Ailing European economic growth and stagnant growth in the United States

have caused many to call for negotiations to improve the trans-Atlantic trade agreement.

Key Facts:

- A trade agreement between the EU and United States is estimated to boost Euro-zone and American GDP by .5% and .4%, respectively
- EU and US officials expect to have a trade agreement in place by the end of 2014
- Removing tariffs would provide relief to ailing European automotive, defense, aerospace, and biotechnology industries.

The United States has several free trade agreements in South America, Asia, and Africa. In addition, the United States is a member of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), an agreement between the US, Mexico, and Canada designed to boost commerce among the three nations by reducing or eliminating restrictions on trade, such as tariffs and import quotas. The number of imports from China into the United States has been steadily increasing over the years as China can satisfy an increasing number of the United States' import needs.

History:

Past attempts to open trade talks between the US and the European trading bloc have been strained due to domestic politics stalling free trade agreements. France, afraid that Europe may be forced into cutting domestic farm subsidies by the US, vehemently opposed a proposed transatlantic trade deal in 1998. France eventually succeeded in bringing negotiations to a standstill and the proposed deal was scrapped. In 2002, the United States imposed a high tariff on European steel exports to protect domestic steel production, which was later removed in 2003. Current tariff levels between the

United States and the European Union remain at an average of 4%. Free trade agreements with the European Union and other countries have been difficult. In 2012, the European automotive industry delayed free trade agreement talks between EU and Japanese officials for over four months.³

Analysis:

A free trade agreement between the United States and the European Union would reduce barriers to trade and investment, thus yielding stronger growth in both economies. A trade agreement between the EU and United States is estimated to boost the Eurozone GDP by 0.5%, or \$116 billion, and the

Talking Points:

- Past failures are unlikely to repeat themselves as American and EU officials are willing to come to a mutually beneficial trade agreement
- A free trade agreement will incentivize other countries to enter similar pacts with the EU and US, which would improve the health of the overall global economy
- Willingness to adopt reasonable, adaptable regulations signify that trading between blocs would not be hindered

United States' by 0.4%, or \$93 billion, by 2027.³ Optimistic projections estimate the pact could boost both economies by 1%. In addition, the trade agreement would boost key industries within the United States and the European Union, such as industrials, capital goods, and financial services. As a result, unemployment would fall as more individuals are hired and cost of outputs fall. In addition, both economies would take another step further from the financial crisis of the late 2000s and early 2010s. Greece and Spain would take progressive steps to stabilize their respective economies while the US could lessen its economic dependence on China.⁴ A pact would stabilize both economies and limit the threat of competition from emerging economies. Rather than BRIC or emerging nations dumping low priced industrial goods into the US and European markets and thus undercutting domestic industries, a free trade agreement would make previously expensive industrial goods from, say, the United States, more accessible to European economies.

Furthermore, a free trade agreement would provide an opportunity to advance international regulations on global challenges, such as climate change and energy. For example, the US and EU could standardize carbon taxes, which would decrease the carbon footprint of the world's largest combined economy while simultaneously providing much-needed income for the EU.

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Aside from the economic gain, the free trade agreement would also send a direct message about global economic governance. Support and implementation of the free trade pact between the EU and US would promote democratic values as well. China's global economic dominance would be balanced by the EU-US pact.

With a strong free trade pact, the US and EU can trade with developing nations and promote democratic ideals to improve governance and foreign relations.

Some opponents contend that the removal of tariffs and barriers may not boost both economies, however. The failure of the World Trade Organization's Doha illustrates the potential difficulties the EU-US trade agreement may encounter.⁵ The proliferation of many trading blocs may create inconsistencies in standards and regulations that could evolve into formidable non-tariff barriers.

Trading between the blocs may become difficult and have an adverse effect on the respective economies, which would nullify the proposed benefits of the EU-US free trade agreement. However, US and EU officials have stated that they would propose reasonable regulations that would be easy to follow and adjust to. Strengthening the connection between financial systems may also be risky. Similarly, opponents have argued that economic interdependence could result in global financial disasters if one country were to experience a downturn, akin to the global financial crisis in the late 2000s. Further strengthening the economic bonds between countries could magnify the effect felt on sister blocs. However, strong growth in one country could have a positive, peripheral effect on other countries. Promising growth in the United States and the European Union indicate that a free trade pact would be mutually beneficial.

Next Steps:

The European Commission has already set negotiation guidelines for FTA talks and the Brussels Forum reiterated the need for a transatlantic agreement. Both the EU and the US have expressed desire for a working agreement by the end of 2014. The United States should hold monthly summits with EU officials with FTA negotiations as the sole priority. Preliminary groundwork for the agreement should be laid in the first few summits with experts providing feasibility analyses and information on potential effects on stakeholders. Negotiations over high-profile items, such as agriculture and alcohol, should be mediated by a third party.

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Defining US Policy Towards Modern Japanese Militarism

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Rising tensions in Asia have led Japan to increase military budgets and training aided by the US. However, it may be in the best interest of the US to preserve Japan's pledge of pacifism rather than encourage the expansion of Japanese military capabilities.

Background:

After World War II the United States-led occupation instituted major reforms to Japanese society. The most radical among them was Article 9 of the new Japanese Constitution in which the Japanese people renounced their ability to wage war. Soon to follow was the US-Japan Security Treaty that obligates the United States to defend Japan if attacked. Consequently, this provided an opportunity for the United States to maintain a large military presence in Asia as tensions with the USSR rose.

Key Facts:

- The JSDF's total force numbers 225, 377 people and has a large navy and air force.
- Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution states that "the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation" and that to accomplish this aim "land, sea, air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained."
- Japan spends 4.68 billion yen (5.17 billion dollars) a year on defence making it one of the largest military budgets in the world.

History:

During the 1950's, liberal and conservative movements within Japan expressed discontent at the US-Japan Security Treaty. By 1960 the conservative government negotiated a revised US-Japan Security that specified that American bases would protect Japan and must consult Japan on the activities staged on these bases. Leftist, and some conservative, movements were fiercely opposed arguing that this submitted Japan to "subordinate independence" under the United States. However, the treaty has remained and is still in effect to this day.¹

This does not mean that the United States has not changed its policy towards Japan. After Okinawa, an island with major American military bases, was reverted back to Japanese control in 1972, a new issue in US-Japan relations emerged concerning the role of Japan in Asian and world security.² In response to waning US presence in Japan,

the US has encouraged the buildup of a sizeable force known as the Japanese Self Defense Forces (JSDF). Japanese politicians justify the creation and continued buildup of the JSDF by describing it as an extension of the police force, similar to a national guard. The JSDF currently boasts over 200,000 men making up a capable army, navy, and air force.³ It is clear that the US-Japan response to declining US military presence has been to increase Japanese military power, despite Article 9.⁴ The expansion of the JSDF is continuing to this day. Most recently, Prime Minister Abe Shinzo increased military spending and training of the JSDF by US marines in the new budget.⁵

Analysis:

However, continuing US encouragement of Japanese military development is a step in the wrong direction by straining tensions in Asia further, hurting the US strategically, and potentially damaging the global economy. This course of action would be a step away from Asian stability. Presumably, if unchecked, Japan would build up a more offensive arsenal to respond to potential threats and pursue its interests. Considering Japanese tensions with North Korea and China, Japanese military development would only increase the likelihood for conflict to break out. With a heavily integrated global economy conflict in Asia would be costly to the people of the US and the world.

Talking Points:

- While the JSDF is a useful humanitarian force for national emergencies-natural disasters frequency plague Japan-it clearly possesses war potential and its existence is still a controversial topic among Japanese today.
- The US, despite imposing Article 9 during the Allied Occupation on Japan soon reversed its stance on Japanese pacifism and has been primary influence in the creation and expansion of the JSDF.

Additionally, the US would benefit strategically by maintaining a mutual security partnership. The recent escalation of harsh rhetoric would justify a US increase via Japan of its defensive capabilities in Asia without provoking much backlash from Japan or China, a strategic gain for the US. Increased American presence in lieu of a Japanese buildup would also deter China and keep Japanese military expansion in check. Furthermore, the American force in the region can be deployed far more quickly than Japan could expand the JSDF.

Within Japan as well many citizens are opposed to enhancing military power and maintain a firm commitment to peace. Today there are many organizations in Japan that are dedicated to defending Article 9 and preserving Japanese pacifism. Many Japanese believe lifting increasing military capabilities would be an ideological step backward away from a more peaceful world.

However, the JSDF serves a practical role in Japan as a force to preserve order and respond to emergencies. Most recently, the JSDF have gained popularity within Japan thanks to its speedy reaction to the 3/11/11 tsunami and aid for those affected by it.⁶ The existence of the JSDF is useful but this force's capabilities should only be expanded to the extent that it can deal with defense, internal order, and national emergencies. Therefore it is in the best interest of the US to support the JSDF in its function as it stands now and encourage its growth at a pace that keeps up with Japanese domestic needs, but does expand so far as to threaten or provoke the rest of Asia.

Next Steps:

The United States and its allies should focus on policies that have proven effective in the past. Education for women, micro-loans to farmers, and increasing the price of alternative crops would incentivize the market away from opium. One potential policy may be making small loans to famers on the precondition that they use it to farm other crops. The United States should also buy alternative crops to increase demand, thereby increasing prices and profitability.

In order to create a viable government the US must provide people with strategic increases in investment. Policies that focus only on eradication, with development investment maybe arriving later, will continue to frustrate the war. US policies must manipulate the market away from opium, rather than fruitlessly try to squash all production.

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Reforming Microfinance & Empowering Africa

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The United States should support the development of better regulation of microfinance, especially in Africa.

Background:

Conventional US foreign aid has often been attacked for being ineffective and even a hindrance to sustained growth, especially in Africa. The \$11 billion in aid Africa receives from the United States often lines the pockets of oppressive dictators rather than creating self-sustaining growth to benefit the entire country.¹ As an alternative, microfinance has grown in popularity as a way to give loans to poor entrepreneurs (usually women) to provide them with the capital necessary to start small businesses and earn a living while paying off their debt.

Key Facts

- The US currently sends \$11 billion in aid to Africa, much of which ends up in state coffers rather than helping the people.
- Today, more than 70 million of the world's poorest families have access to microcredit and that number has been growing by more than 35% annually

Since the 1980's, microfinance's popularity has grown rapidly. The majority of microcredit to developing countries now comes from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), nonprofit organizations, and for-profit banks based in the United States. Even the US government now funds \$119 million in microloans to businesses in the US.² Many countries receiving microcredit, most recently India, have passed legislation to regulate this budding financial market by capping interest rates and ensuring "fair and reasonable methods" for recovering loans.³ However, in many African countries, there is little to no governmental regulation or even strong, centralized bank to control interest rates.⁴

History:

In 1976, Mohammed Yunus and a few volunteers began experimenting with providing credit to the poor in a small village in Bangladesh.

Yunus believed that microcredit was not only financially sustainable but also capable of unleashing a development wonder by giving the impoverished the means to help themselves.

His small loans grew into the Grameen Bank and became a major impetus behind the microfinance movement, earning him a Nobel Peace Prize. From its humble roots, microfinance has grown tremendously over the last three decades. Today, more than 70 million of the world's poorest families have access to microcredit, and that number has been growing by more than 35% annually.⁵

Analysis:

Some critics argue that microfinance has little impact on aggregate poverty in Africa.⁶ Yet, in South Asia (especially Bangladesh), microfinance case studies have found that microcredit has the ability to reduce village poverty rates by 5-30% over five years.⁷ One major difference between the two regions is the variation in regulatory structures surrounding microfinance.

Talking Points

- Microfinance is a promising development tool that encourages entrepreneurship among poor people without access to capital
- In countries with strong regulations, microfinance has helped reduce village poverty rates by 5-30% over five years

In Bangladesh, strong centralized banks have been able to pair microcredit with other financial services, such as assistance with business plans and market projections, as well as cap interest rates to match the market's.⁸ Indonesia's legislation allows longer grace periods before default and lower interest rates for "non-profitable" loans, such as those for healthcare and education, while charging gradually increasing (but still restrained) rates for profitable ventures.⁹ With these regulations, the microfinance market in South Asia has continued to grow and alleviate poverty.

Without such regulations in place, many African countries (and India) have seen microfinance gone awry. Many borrowers are driven to suicide by stress from excess loans, and misuse of loans is rampant.

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A case study of Zambia indicated that many villagers took out loans for non-profitable ventures, such as healthcare, and continued taking out loans to supplement their interest payments. After defaulting, families were stripped of their savings, houses and all other assets.¹⁰ Without regulations to protect borrowers and ensure transparency and information symmetry, microfinance can have high default rates and exacerbate poverty. Complicating the matter, many African governments have so far been unwilling or unable to create such regulations.

Next Steps:

To make microfinance a viable poverty-reduction tool, the United States must regulate MFI's that operate within its borders and lend to Africa. Organizations wishing to set up ventures abroad should be required to submit proposals through USAID to obtain approval and subsidies (to prevent them from simply relocating to other countries). The first step is to cap interest rates for profitable loans at market rates, and lower for other large, necessary purchases (such as education and healthcare). Next, MFI's must be required to provide financial planning assistance to all borrowers, in all necessary languages, to bridge all communication gaps about repayment expectations. Finally, borrowers must be limited to one loan to prevent over borrowing and default.

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US Bases in Japan and the Refashioning of US-Japan Relations

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The United States should downsize its military commitment in Japan by closing unnecessary naval bases.

Background:

The United States maintains military bases throughout the globe. These marine, army, naval, and air force bases vary in size and utility, and many are little more than Cold War relics. Consequently, many of the U.S.' bases unduly contribute to the U.S. defense

budget's extensive drain on the federal budget, and a few even generate ill will towards Americans. The American military bases in Okinawa exemplify these problems.

The U.S. military presence in Okinawa is remnant of a post-World War II and Cold War era assertion of US global dominance and security institutions. The United States' Marine Corps Air Station Futenma and the Kadena Air Base remain two of the largest and costliest Japanese military endeavors. Though supported by most current Japanese leaders, Okinawans and some political leaders fervently oppose this symbol of American imperialism. These Okinawans resent the two bases for the pollution and danger they have brought to the island.

Various proposals of relocation have been made for some of these Okinawan bases, but no real plan has been implemented. In 2013, the American and Japanese governments came to terms on a removal and relocation plan for six of the military bases in Okinawa, including the MCAS Futenma. This plan would create replacement bases to northern Okinawa, near the Camp Schwab base.¹ However, the problem lies in the U.S.' excessive occupation of Okinawa and thus replacement will not solve local concerns or budget problems.

Key Facts:

- The 1960 Treaty of Mutual cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States created a mutual defense agreement for both countries, obligating the US to defend Japanese territories in exchange for US military presence in Japan.²
- The United States Spends \$250 billion annually on foreign military bases.³

History:

The American occupation of Okinawa has always been oppressive for locals. The United States has occupied Okinawa since their victory in the Battle of Okinawa in 1945.⁴ After the battle and the war, the U.S. seized ownership of Okinawa and the rest of the Ryukyu Islands and began building military bases on the island, often lawfully paying landowners, but occasionally forcefully expelling inhabitants.⁵ During this time, the Okinawans were victims of these and thousands of other crimes by military personnel including hundreds of counts of “murder, burglary, and rape.”⁶

Though the reinstatement of Japanese rule in Okinawa in 1972 mitigated these crimes now that Okinawans had their own judicial authority to prosecute American service members, crime is still rampant.⁷ The increase in U.S. military personnel in Okinawa due to the Korean War, Vietnam War, and increased security concerns in East Asia has led to further Okinawan concern for the bases’ potential physical and environmental danger. There have been numerous instances of aircraft crashes near both Kadena and Futenma resulting in infrastructure damage and civilian casualties, noise pollution, and fears of “degradation of natural habitats.”⁸

Analysis:

The United States’ continued occupation of Okinawa is justified primarily by the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States, which obligates the US and Japan to jointly defend Japanese territories while allowing for US military presence in Japan to “provide security for

Japan and the Far East.”⁹ The increased military might of countries like China and North Korea incentivize the U.S. to prolong its stay in Japan and further shore up military bases there. The United States’ long term goal in East Asia is to maximize positive relations with these East Asian powers while still deterring potential conflicts.

However, Japan must transition toward a less dependent military defense if it wants to

Talking Points

- Japan needs to take steps to become militarily self-sufficient
- Other U.S. bases in South Korea and Japan provide substantial deterrent capabilities to compensate for Kadena and Futenma
- Relocation will never be condoned by Okinawans and will always put a strain on U.S.-Japan relations

serve its own self-interests rather than America's interests.¹⁰ This will also transition the United States away from its interventionist mentality, so it can stop defending countries that can now defend themselves. Excessive intervention in defense policy risks unnecessary danger for servicemen and balloons the budget deficit.

A reduction in military bases in Okinawa would start a “refashioning” of U.S.-Japan relations.¹¹ Most recently in 2013 the two countries have come to another agreement relocating MCAS Futenma to other cities in Okinawa, but the problem still persists.¹² The Okinawan base subject has caused historical strains on U.S.-Japanese relations, preventing the two nations from discussing other more important matters. The conflict can never fully be resolved as long as the U.S. continues to try and relocate the bases on Okinawa, rather than remove them because Okinawans will never be complacent with this continued occupation.

The only legal complication in removal is the Japanese Constitution. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution functionally forbids Japan to ever completely become independent of the U.S. military because it relinquished Japan’s right to wage war or to use force in international disputes.¹³ However, this Article has been stretched to allow for a minor Japanese defense force backed heavily by U.S. military presence. Article 9 remains an inevitable roadblock to complete Japanese military independence. Thus, it is necessary for Japan to partially increase their military independence and partially decrease their dependence on the U.S., rather than transition towards complete militarily independence.

Additionally, a decrease in the United States’ presence will create partial military independence for Japan. Then, Japan can defend itself more substantially from the possible threats of China and North Korea rather than have full dependence on the United States. Second, a withdrawal of U.S. presence in Japan makes America symbolically less of a threat to North Korea and China, reducing the likelihood of an East Asian power struggle. However, this will not reduce the U.S.’ capabilities of deterrence significantly. The United States’ deterrent for possible Korean conflicts are its bases in South Korea and many additional bases remain in Japan, even in Okinawa. Consequently, removal of two bases in Okinawa allows the U.S. to make a symbolic gesture while continuing to have the capabilities to address conflicts in East Asia. If the U.S. wants to improve its East Asian relations while not significantly reducing its stronghold there, it must remove the Kadena Air Base and MCAS Futenma from Okinawa.

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Next Steps:

In order to minimize costs and decrease East Asian opposition to America, the U.S. needs to remove these two bases from Okinawa. Closing down Kadena Air Base and MCAS Futenma signals to the Japanese people that America understands the plight of the Okinawans. Furthermore, as long as the 1960 Treaty exists the United States can remain dedicated to protecting Japan.

These steps are necessary to create a new American partnership with Japan. The United States needs to begin expanding its relations with Japan into a relationship that signals American attention to the needs of the Japanese people rather than the Japanese government.

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Retooling Foreign Aid to Egypt to Promote Democratic Consolidation

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The United States must re-evaluate its foreign aid to Egypt in order to promote a peaceful consolidation of democracy and respect for human and political rights.

Background:

The United States State Department has requested an allocation of \$47.8 billion for 2014, accounting for approximately 1% of the overall budget.¹ Foreign aid has been traditionally designated to promote programs and interests of the American people and has been a crucial foreign policy tool since the end of WWII. The United States provides Egypt with \$1.3 billion in aid annually, making it the second largest recipient of US foreign aid behind Israel.² Historically the package has been tied to Egypt's treaty with Israel, signed in 1979 with US participation. Since the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, the Obama administration has committed to continuing its assistance to Egypt and has pledged an additional \$1 billion to "support Egypt's democratic revolution".³ This new one time pledge has been repeatedly linked to democracy promotion.

Key Facts:

- The United States provides Egypt with \$1.3 billion in annual aid and has pledged \$1 billion in additional aid to "support Egypt's democratic transition"
- Egypt's government and security forces continue to arrest opposition activists

History:

Since the 2011 Revolution Egypt has moved towards democracy, but many obstacles remain. May of 2011 Egypt has held four major elections: the 2011-12 parliamentary elections, the 2012 presidential elections and two referenda on constitutional issues. The Muslim Brotherhood has emerged victorious from each of these contests, but they have been accused by opposition members of suppressing opponents and perpetrating varying degrees of voter fraud.⁴ Concerning to democratic development was the December of 2011 diplomatic crisis which arose between the United States and Egypt after Egyptian security forces raided the offices of 17 US-based NGOs and threatened to expel them from the country.⁵ In addition to these isolated events, security forces are still arresting dissenters without trial and activists claim that their freedom of speech is being impinged upon.

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Analysis:

If the United States is serious about democracy promotion in Egypt then there must be concrete conditions tying aid to Egypt to democracy promotion. Crucial elements include protection of democracy advocates and NGOs, more accurate election monitoring, and assurances of the right to free speech and opposition. These commitments must be made into explicit written conditions and should be enforced by the Obama administration. As opposed to increasing US sponsored programs that can be stigmatized by their association with foreign funding, insuring the safety of local activists and their projects can properly use American political clout to encourage the growth of Egyptian civil society.

Talking Points

- Foreign aid has been an important tool of American interests since the end of WWII
- The United States has used aid to help maintain Egypt's treaty with Israel and can do the same for democracy promotion

Next Steps:

The United States State Department should adopt an official stance that calls for the revocation of partial sums of aid to Egypt for each incidence the following: (1) the arrest without warrant or trial of known non-violent political activists (2) evidence of election tampering or fraud (3) physical and political intimidation of dissidents by state forces or (4) the revocation of NGO charters based on political stances.

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A Policy to Support the Creation of “Domestically-Grown Think-Tanks” (DGTs) in Tunisia

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The early riser of the Arab Spring, Tunisia’s democratic transition is a bellwether for the region. The fall of the Ben-Ali dictatorship has opened new space for civil society, and the United States must support the growth of domestic, non-partisan, and politically independent think tanks in Tunisia in order to improve the prospects for democracy.

Background:

The history of civil society in Tunisia, especially after the Arab Spring, is one of dependence on continued US funding. The ousting of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in 2011 resulted in the first free elections in Tunisia and the developments of an infant democracy. Under Ben Ali, most of the few civil society organizations (CSOs) that existed were completely dependent on the Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) ruling party. The few independent organizations that existed were either one-party ruled labor unions or Islamist dominated associations.¹ Although Salafist violence and unrest is gradually increasing, there has been an upward growth in independent CSOs in Tunisia.² However, the nonexistence of an independent, non-US partnered think-tank that influences policy, lobbies, and unites voters and intellectuals is a growing issue that needs to be addressed. The lack of domestically grown and independent think tanks (DGTs) is a problem for Tunisia’s nascent democracy and represents a wider Arab shortage of DGTs as well as domestically-grown civil society organizations, especially after the Arab Spring.

Key Facts:

- The ousting of President Ben Ali in 2011 resulted in Tunisia’s first free elections
- Under Ben Ali, most civil society organizations were dependent on the ruling Constitutional Democratic Rally party (RCD)
- After the Jasmine Revolution of 2011, the US pledged to support a Tunisian transition to democracy with over \$55 million in non-

History:

The recently released “Global Go To Think Tanks” Report showed that more than 60 percent of global think-tanks are in North America and Europe.³ The Arab world is relatively barren of think-tanks, although there do exist several American institutes in the region.

New frameworks in the Tunisian government after the removal of the Ben-Ali regime in 2011 necessitate a more advanced civil society in the nation.

As Secretary of State Clinton stated quite eloquently just shortly after the regime change in Tunisia during the Arab Spring, “As Tunisia’s brave citizens chart a new democratic future, they continue to set an example for the region and the world. The United States remains committed to working

with the government and people of Tunisia as they pursue a more peaceful, prosperous and democratic future”.⁴ An example of this support of civil society is demonstrated by The US Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), a program by the US government that continues to be part of American efforts to empower the Tunisian citizens during this governmental transition. Since the toppling of the regime, MEPI has supported more than 30 civil society projects in Tunisia.⁵ However, none of these civil society projects are policy research centers or think-tanks. It is important, especially at this pivotal moment in Tunisian history, for the United States to support the transition to more Arab civil society initiatives.

Analysis:

After the Jasmine revolution of 2011, the US pledged to support “Tunisian transition” with more than \$55 million in non-security assistance. \$43.3 million of that amount went towards democracy-building efforts, civil society, and “promoting freedom of expression”.⁶ There are about a dozen notable universities in Tunisia, each of them public besides for Tunisian Private University, or ULT.⁷ MEPI and the USAID’s Middle East Bureau have worked primarily together to establish various initiatives in MENA states. For 2014, \$30 million was pledged from USAID for Tunisia, and in 2011 and 2012, as explained in USAID’s 2014 budget request, the Agency has “reallocating over \$1.5 billion in existing funds from ongoing bilateral programs and from other sources to transitions in the Middle East and North Africa.”⁸ There is a Middle East Incentive Fund of \$750,000, which aims to go towards more long-term change and is not allocated to any specific country in MENA.⁹ There is a gap in policy in regards to think-tanks and think-tank support in MENA by the United States, especially in regards to lessening foreign dependence and promoting Arab intellectual unity and policy discussion.

Talking Points

- A change in US policy to support DGTs in Tunisia will help consolidate the infant democracy by uniting intellectual and policy makers
- The base loan would ensure the project is not continually funded, as most MENA programs are, thus allowing from a more independent initiative

In the past, American initiatives to support Middle Eastern civil society have been vague. In what form the support could take and how long the support would be present are two questions that loom over this idea. A change in US policy towards Tunisia would consolidate Tunisia's infant democracy in the wake of Ben-Ali's jettison, while simultaneously working to counteract the Salafist initiatives which have led to unrest especially in March-April 2013.¹⁰ The development and solidification of a Tunisian think-tank (a symbol of the wider Middle Eastern need for more Arab think-tanks) is long overdue and is necessary to promote this new idealized system of democracy in Tunisia as well as unite intellectuals, scholars and thinkers alike.

Next Steps:

A dual-pronged policy to initiate USAID training programs for Tunisian university scholars, students, and policy experts while opening up a partnership between notable public universities in the United States and public or private Tunisian universities is pivotal, especially at this fragile time in Tunisian politics. The initiative will receive a base fund or micro-loan, rather than continual funding such as the current US governmental initiatives in Tunisia and the Arab World, in order to allow the think-tank to truly grow in a grassroots manner. A university partnership, especially, is important to extracting an intellectual and scholar class in Tunisia that can influence policy, but it is important for the US government to ensure in the long-term that the fund goes towards academic institutions with limited extremist ties but also is able to balance both secular and Islamist interests. This fund can be established in a way similar to the MENA Incentive Fund that was established by the US Government in the sense that it is sectioned off for a particular purpose.

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Amy Frieder, Analyst, is a sophomore in the School of Industrial and Labor Relations with minors in International Relations and Near Eastern Studies. Amy's last policy proposal on incentivizing investment in companies run by Arab women in order to empower them to achieve equal gender rights was selected to appear in the national *10 Ideas* journal. Following the publication, Amy attended the U.N. Commission on Social Development as a SustainUS youth delegate. This summer she will be interning at the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, where she will be furthering her interests in law, social justice, and fair employment policy.

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
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Noah Berman, Analyst, is a graduating senior in the College of Arts and Sciences, majoring in Near Eastern Studies. This is his second semester writing for the Roosevelt Institute. For fun, Noah boxes and travels. Noah plans on relocating to Tel Aviv, Israel after graduation to work in the NGO sector.



Daniel Cohanpour, Analyst, is a sophomore Government major from Long Island, considering a minor in Near Eastern Studies and Information Science. His academic focus is international development and good governance, and his research interests lie in civil society and non-governmental organizations, with a regional specialization in the Middle East and North Africa. Besides for his involvement with Roosevelt, Daniel is the Under-Secretary General of Committees for the Cornell International Affairs Conference, Consultant for Social Business Consulting Group, Ambassador for College of Arts and Sciences, and Committee Member for the on-campus Hillel group.



Aaron Glickman, Director, is a graduating senior in the College of Arts and Sciences. He is an honors government major, and his thesis studies the interplay between the private security industry and international peacekeeping. This is his second semester as the director of the Center for Foreign Policy and International Studies. Prior to joining the Roosevelt Institute, Aaron worked as a researcher at the Project on Middle East Democracy in Washington DC and studied abroad in Jordan and Egypt. He hopes to continue working in democratic development after graduation.



"In every country the people themselves are more peaceably and liberally inclined than their governments." -Franklin Delano Roosevelt

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